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Abstract
We investigate a mixed market in which a state-owned, welfare-maximizing public firm
competes against profit-maximizing n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms. A
circular city model with quantity-setting competition is employed. We find that the equilib-
rium location pattern depends on m. All private firms agglomerate in the unique equilibrium
if m is zero or one. Two foreign firms induce differentiation between domestic and foreign pri-
vate firms. More than two foreign firms yield differentiation among foreign firms. Regardless
of n and m, the agglomeration of all domestic private firms appears in equilibrium. We pro-
vide several conditions in which eliminating the public firm from the market enhances social
welfare. We extend the basic model and investigate three issues concerning multiple public
firms, inefficiency of the public firm, and entries by private firms. We obtain some additional
implications of welfare and equilibrium locations.
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1 Introduction
Studies of mixed markets, in which state-owned welfare-maximizing public firms compete against
profit-maximizing private firms, have become increasingly popular in recent years.1 Mixed oligopolies
are common in developed, developing, and former communist transitional economies.2 In Japan, in
particular, competition between private and public firms exists in many oligopolistic markets, such
as those for banking services, housing loans, life insurance, broadcasting services, and overnight
deliveries.3
In many of these mixed markets, it is often the case that private firms adopt very similar
strategies, exhibiting “herd behavior” that differs from that of public firms. The herd behavior
exhibited by Japanese city banks is a typical example. In this market, private banks compete
domestically against strong public banks, such as the Postal Bank and the Public House Loan
Corporation. Accordingly, many of these private banks rush into the international financial markets
to avoid domestic competition.4
Most existing works on mixed oligopoly, as well as our earlier work, investigate the competition
between public and domestic private firms. In real world economies, however, competitors of public
firms are not limited to domestic private firms. For example, the New Zealand government set up a
state-owned public bank to compete against private foreign banks. Similarly, when the government
of Brazil bargained with the Swiss medical company Roche, it used a public medical institution
as a potential competitor in the domestic market. E´lectricite´ de France and Gas de France also
compete against foreign private firms in the EU energy markets. Recently, many foreign private
financial institutions rushed into the Japanese financial markets, which are typical mixed mar-
kets, as discussed above. Airline, telecommunication, natural gas, electric power, automobile, and
steel industries in many developed and developing countries are also typical examples. Recently,
literature on mixed oligopoly with foreign competitors has begun to appear, including Fjell and
Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), and Matsumura (2003a). All of these studies indicate that the
existence of foreign competitors (even a single one) drastically changes the equilibrium outcomes.
1 For pioneering work on mixed oligopolies, see Merrill and Schneider (1966). See Bo¨s (1986, 1991), Vickers and
Yarrow (1988), and Nett (1993) for excellent surveys.
2 The interest in mixed oligopolies is due to their importance to the economies of Europe, Canada, and Japan
more than to that of the US. However, there are examples of mixed oligopolies in the US, such as the packaging
and overnight-delivery industries.
3 See, e.g., Ide and Hayashi (1992).
4 Several examples of herd behavior are described in Matsushima and Matsumura (2003).
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In this paper, we also consider foreign competitors explicitly and investigate how the presence
of foreign competitors affects the “herd behavior” in mixed oligopolies. We again use a location
model with a circular city in which firms deliver goods (shipping model).5 We find that the number
of foreign firms substantially affects the equilibrium location patterns. If the number of foreign
competitors is zero or one, the equilibrium location pattern is unique, and all private firms (both
domestic and foreign) agglomerate at the side of the circle opposite the location of the public
firm. In other words, a single foreign firm does not affect the equilibrium locational choices of
private firms. However, if the number of foreign firms is two, multiple equilibria appear. In every
equilibrium, each domestic private firm inevitably changes its location, while it is possible that two
foreign private firms still locate at the side of the circle opposite the location of the public firm.
If the number of foreign private firms is more than two, the agglomeration of foreign firms never
appears in equilibrium. In other words, more than two foreign firms yield differentiation among
foreign firms. Regardless of the number of foreign private firms and that of domestic private
firms, it is possible that all domestic private firms agglomerate at one point, although the point
of agglomeration depends on the number of foreign firms. These results then indicate that when
the number of foreign firms is relatively small, the effects on the locational choices by domestic
firms are limited. An increase in the number of foreign firms causes a change of locational choice
by domestic private firms, and a further increase yields diversification among foreign private firms,
while it is possible for diversification among domestic private firms to be limited (herd behavior).
We extend the basic model and investigate three issues concerning multiple public firms, inef-
ficient public firm, and entries by private firms. In the first issue, we show that the locations of
the multiple public firms crucially depend on the number of foreign firms. In the second issue, we
show that the removal of the inefficient public firm may improve welfare. In the third issue, we
show several examples concerning the relation between the number of entrants (private firms) and
the entry costs.
In this paper, we use spatial price discrimination models with Cournot competition. Hamilton,
Thisse, and Weskamp (1989) and Anderson and Neven (1991) have carried out pioneering work
on location models with quantity competition.6 In a spatial price discrimination model, we can
5 For discussions on mixed oligopoly with spatial competition, see Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse (1991), Mat-
sumura and Matsushima (2003, 2004), and Nilssen and Sørgard (2002). For applications of circular-city shipping
Cournot models see, for example, Matsushima (2001) and Matsumura (2003b).
6 Greenhut and Greenhut (1975) and Norman (1981) have already examined Cournot competition in spatial
models, but they discussed the equilibrium price pattern rather than the equilibrium pattern of location. Recently,
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interpret “space” as product variety and each firm’s location as its most efficient sector. We
can also interpret distant locations from a firm as inefficient sectors of the firm. For example,
in the automobile industry, “space” represents car size, and a firm’s location indicates that the
firm produces small cars efficiently but produces large cars inefficiently. This interpretation is
similar to those of Eaton and Schmitt (1994) and Norman and Thisse (1999). To explain flexible
manufacturing systems (FMS), they use spatial price discrimination models.
Following this interpretation, our model is applicable to the analysis of mixed markets, where
multi-product firms face Cournot competition. The European automobile industry is a typical
example of such mixed markets. Most automobile enterprises are multi-product firms. Several
automobile manufacturers are state ownership companies. Renault is a partially state-owned com-
pany, and Volkswagen is also owned by the government of Lower Saxony, which owns a 20% stake
in the firm. Most economists describe the competition in the automobile industry using Cournot
models. The airline industry is another typical example. In this industry, there were (and still
are) state-owned airline companies, such as Air France. Airline companies are also multi-product
(multi-market) firms, and there are papers treating airline companies as multi-product firms (e.g.,
Borenstein (1991) and Gimeno (1999)). The market structure of airline industry is reasonably
consistent with a Cournot model, where firms commit to quantities and then prices adjust along
the reaction curves. The Cournot assumption is common to most empirical studies on the airline
industry (e.g., Brander and Zhang (1990, 1993), Fischer and Kamerschen (2003), Reiss and Spiller
(1989) and Richard (2003)).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model.
In Section 3, we investigate the equilibrium outcomes of the model. Section 4 discusses welfare
implications. Section 5 extends the basic model and investigate three issues that are ignored in
the basic analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We formulate an oligopoly model in a mixed market, in which a welfare-maximizing public firm
competes against profit-maximizing domestic private firms and foreign private firms. Firm 0 is the
public firm, and there exist n domestic private firms (firm 1, firm 2,..., firm n) andm foreign private
the literature on location-quantity models has become richer and more diverse. For example, Chamorro-Rivas (2000)
and Pal and Sarkar (2002) consider spatial Cournot competition among multi-plant firms.
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firms.7 LetD ≡ {1, 2, ..., n} denote the set of domestic private firms and F ≡ {n+1, n+2, ..., n+m}
denote the set of foreign private firms.
We now present a two-stage location-quantity game. The basic structure of the model is from
Pal (1998a). Let xi (i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n+m}) be the locations of firm i. xi is the point on the circle
located at a distance from 0 (measured clockwise).
In the first stage, firm 0 locates at a point on the circle. Without loss of generality, we assume
that firm 0 locates at x0 = 0. Later, each private firm i (i ∈ {1, . . . , n+m}) simultaneously chooses
its location xi. Let qi(x) denote the firm i’s output offered at each point x ∈ [0, 1]. x is the point
on the circle located at a distance from 0 (measured clockwise). In the second stage, each firm
i (i ∈ {0, . . . , n+m}) observes its competitors’ locations and simultaneously chooses qi(x) ∈ [0,∞)
for x ∈ [0, 1]. Let p(x) denote the price of the product at x and
q(x) ≡
n+m∑
i=0
qi(x)
denote the total quantity supplied at x. We assume that the demand function at each point x is
linear and is given by:
p(x) = a− bq(x),
where a and b are positive constants. Let d(x, xi) denote the distance between x and xi. This
signifies the shorter distance of the two possible ways to transfer the goods along the perimeter.
To ship a unit of the product from its own location to a consumer at point x, each firm i (i ∈
{0, . . . , n + m}) pays a transport cost td(x, xi), where t is a constant value. Firms are able to
discriminate among consumers since they control transportation. Consumer arbitrage is assumed
to be prohibitively costly.8 Each of (n+m+1) firms has identical technology and constant marginal
cost of production, which is normalized to zero. These assumptions are standard and also made
in many other location–quantity models.
7 In this paper, the government is not permitted to nationalize more than one firm. As pointed out by Merrill
and Schneider (1966), the most efficient outcome is achieved by the nationalization of all firms, if nationalization
does not change the costs of firms (i.e., no X-inefficiency in the public firm exists). The need for the analysis of a
mixed oligopoly lies in the fact that it is impossible or undesirable, for political or economic reasons, to nationalize
an entire sector. For example, without competitors, public firms may lose the incentive to improve their costs,
resulting in a loss of social welfare. Thus, we do not consider the possibility of nationalizing all firms.
8 This assumption is not essential. Unless transportation costs for consumers are strictly smaller than those
of firms, consumer arbitrage plays no role in our model. For this discussion, see Hamilton, Thisse, and Weskamp
(1989).
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3 Equilibrium
In this section, we discuss the equilibrium in the model formulated above. We use subgame
perfection as the equilibrium concept. The game is solved by backward induction. First, we
discuss the equilibrium outcomes in the second-stage subgames given the location of each firm.
3.1 Quantity choice
We follow the Cournot assumption that firms compete in quantities at each point in the market.
Since marginal production costs are constant, quantities set at different points by the same firm
are strategically independent. Cournot equilibria can be characterized by a set of independent
Cournot equilibria, one for each point x. Let pii(x) denote firm i’s (i ∈ {1, . . . , n+m}) profit at x,
given the locations of all firms;
pii(x) = (a− bq(x)− t(d(x, xi))) qi(x). (1)
Let w(x) denote the domestic social surplus (consumer surplus plus profits of all domestic firms)
at x.
w(x) =
∫ q(x)
0
(a− bm)dm− q(x)(a− bq(x)) +
n∑
i=0
(a− bq(x)− td(x, xi))qi(x). (2)
The first-order condition of firm 0 and firm i (i ∈ {1, . . . , n+m}) is given, respectively, by
a− td(x, x0)− bq0(x)− b
n∑
i=1
qi(x) = 0, (3)
a− td(x, xi)− bqi(x)− b
n+m∑
i=0
qi(x) = 0. (4)
In this paper, we assume that the whole market will always be served by firm 0. This assumption
is satisfied if 2a ≥ t(n+ 1).9
We first show that the output level of all domestic firms (both public and private) does not
depend on the locations of domestic private firms.
Lemma 1 (i) q0 +
∑
i∈D qi does not depend on xi ∈ D. (ii) For any i ∈ D ∪ F , qi(x) = 0 if
d(x, x0) ≤ d(x, xi).
Proof: See Appendix.
We explain Lemma 1(i) intuitively. Let R0(q1, q2, ..., qn+m+1) denote the reaction function of
firm 0 in the second-stage game. From (3), we have ∂R0/∂qi = −1 for all i ∈ D. In other words,
9 A similar assumption (sufficiently large a) is also made in many studies of mixed oligopoly and quantity-setting
spatial models. See, among others, Anderson and Neven (1991) and Pal (1998a).
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one unit reduction of firm i’s output (i ∈ D) increases the best output of firm 0 by one unit. xi
affects the marginal cost of firm i for each market x and may therefore affect the equilibrium qi(x).
However, this effect is offset by the behavior of firm 0, so the output level of all domestic firms
does not depend on xi (i ∈ D). Since the total output level of all firms other than firm j (j ∈ F )
does not depend on xi (i ∈ D), xi never affects the output of each foreign firm.
On the other hand, the locations of foreign firms affect the total output, so they also affect the
profits of all firms. Let F˜ (x) and m˜(x) denote the set of foreign firms supplying at market x and
the number of such firms, respectively, The total quantity supplied and the price are:
q(x) =
(m˜(x) + 1)a− td(x, x0)−
∑
j∈F˜ (x)
td(x, xj)
(m˜(x) + 1)b
, (5)
p(x) =
td(x, x0) +
∑
j∈F˜ (x)
td(x, xj)
(m˜(x) + 1)
. (6)
The output quantity and profit of firm i supplying for market x are given by
qi(x) =
td(x, x0) +
∑
j∈F˜ (x)
td(x, xj)− (m˜(x) + 1)td(x, xi)
(m˜(x) + 1)b
, (7)
pii(x) =
td(x, x0) + ∑
j∈F˜ (x)
td(x, xj)− (m˜(x) + 1)td(x, xi)
2
(m˜(x) + 1)2b
. (8)
If firm i does not supply for market x (i.e., (7) is non-positive), its profit from market x is zero.
From (8), we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 The profits of firm i ∈ D ∪ F do not depend on xj if j 6= i and j ∈ D.
A foreign firm j supplies for market x only if d(x, x0) ≥ d(x, xj). p(x) in (6) is smaller than or
equal to td(x, x0) (the price in which foreign firms do not enter). Therefore, we have the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that foreign firms supply at x. The price at x, p(x), is smaller than that in
which foreign firms do not enter. In other word, consumer surplus at x is higher than that in which
foreign firms do not enter.
3.2 Location choice
In this subsection, the equilibrium locations are discussed. First, we present a result describing
the equilibrium location without foreign private firms as a benchmark.
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Result (Matsushima and Matsumura (2003)) If m = 0, in the unique equilibrium, all private
firms agglomerate at 1/2 (the side of the circle opposite the location of the public firm).
We now discuss the equilibrium location patterns with foreign private firms. Lemma 2 states
that the location of each domestic private firm does not affect the profits of other firms at all. This
implies that none of the firms needs to worry about where the domestic private firms locate. Thus,
each domestic private firm can choose its location without considering its strategic effect. Under
these conditions, if one point is the best location for a domestic private firm, then it is also the
best location for all other domestic firms. Thus, the agglomeration of all domestic private firms
can always appear in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 At least one equilibrium exists in which all domestic private firms agglomerate at
one point.
Proof: See Appendix.
However, this property does not hold true for foreign firms. The location of one foreign firm
does affect the output choice of all other foreign firms; thus, the location choices made by a foreign
firm have a strategic effect. Owing to this strategic interaction, the optimal location of one foreign
firm depends on the locations of other foreign firms.
Proposition 2 Suppose that m = 1. In the unique equilibrium xi = 1/2 for all i ∈ D ∪ F.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 indicates that agglomeration of all private firms still appears even after one foreign
firm enters the market. This result, however, does not hold true if there are two or more foreign
firms. Proposition 3 indicates that two foreign firms yield a differentiation between foreign and
domestic private firms, although it is possible that two foreign firms still locate at the side of the
circle opposite the location of the public firm. Proposition 4 states that more than two foreign
firms yield differentiation among foreign firms.
Proposition 3 Suppose that m = 2. (i) The following location choices constitute an equilibrium:
each domestic private firm i chooses either xi = 5−
√
3
11 ∼ 0.297 or xi = 6+
√
3
11 ∼ 0.703, and each
foreign firm j chooses xj = 1/2. (ii) The following location choices also constitute an equilibrium:
each domestic private firm i chooses either xi = 18−
√
66
30 ∼ 0.329 or xi = 12+
√
66
30 ∼ 0.671, one
foreign firm j chooses xj = 13/30 and the other foreign firm k chooses xk = 17/30.
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Proof: See Matsushima and Matsumura (2005).
Proposition 4 Suppose that m > 2. The agglomeration of all foreign firms never appears in
equilibrium.
Proof: See Matsushima and Matsumura (2005).
We explain the intuition behind Propositions 2–4. Suppose that all private firms locate at the
point 1/2. We consider whether or not each private firm has an incentive for deviating this location
strategy, given the other firms’ location.
From (8), we can assume that the markets near 0 (the location of the public firm) are not
profitable, since td(x, x0) is small. In other words, the markets near 0 are not profitable for each
private firm; thus, there is a strong incentive to avoid this severe competition against the public
firm. As a result, a private firm chooses the furthest location from the public firm. This mechanism
is in common with Matsushima and Matsumura (2003). This is called the “public firm effect.” At
the same time, the markets near 1/2 (the location of the foreign firms) are not profitable, since
m˜ = m for the markets near point 1/2 (we have defined m˜ as the number of supplying foreign
firms). Thus, each firm has an incentive to be far away from point 1/2. This is called the “foreign
firm effect.” An increase in m accelerates the competition and reduces the prices at the markets
near 1/2. Therefore, the foreign firm effect depends on m.
Then, given the locations of all other firms, one firm (firm k) deviates and slightly reduces xk
from 1/2. This reduces the distance from the location of the public firm and increases the distance
from the locations of foreign firms. If the foreign firm effect dominates the public firm effect, it
increases the profits of firm k. The foreign firm effect is increasing in the number of foreign firms
other than firm k; thus, there naturally exists a threshold value dominating the public firm effect.
In our model, this threshold value is two. If the number of other foreign firms is two or more, firm
k has the above-mentioned deviation incentive.
The number of foreign firms other than itself locating at 1/2 is m for each domestic private
firm and m− 1 for each foreign firm. Suppose that m = 1. The number of foreign firms other than
itself locating at 1/2 is 0 or 1 for all private firms and the public firm effect dominates the foreign
firm effect. This is the reason why all private firms agglomerate at 1/2 when m = 1 (Proposition
2). Suppose that m = 2. The number of foreign firms other than itself locating at 1/2 is 1 for
foreign firms and 2 for domestic firms. Thus, the public firm effect dominates the foreign firm
effect for each foreign firm, but the foreign firm effect dominates the public firm effect for each
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domestic private firm. This is the reason why domestic private firms do not chooses the location
1/2, while two foreign firms choose it (Proposition 3(i)). Suppose that m ≥ 3. The number of
foreign firms other than itself locating at 1/2 is 2 or more for all private firms, and the foreign firm
effect dominates the public firm effect. Thus, there is no equilibrium where m foreign firms locate
at 1/2 (Proposition 4).
We now mention the difference between the location patterns of Proposition 3(i) and 3(ii).
Consider the two-foreign-firm case. We denote one foreign firm as “firm a” and the other as “firm
b.” Proposition 3(i) states that firm a’s optimal location is 1/2 when xb = 1/2, and Proposition
3(ii) states that it is 13/30 when xb = 17/30. This implies that an increase in the distance between
firm b’s location and the public firm’s enlarges firm a’s optimal distance from the public firm’s
location. We explain the reason behind this strategic complementarity. Suppose that xb = 17/30.
Firm a chooses its location which balances the public firm and the foreign firm effects, and it is
13/30. Suppose that firm b moves from 17/30 to 1/2. The move enhances the public firm effect
at market 13/30 because the move reduces firm b’s cost for market 13/30 and induces the larger
output of the public firm. Since the move strengthens the public firm effect, firm a has a higher
incentive for moving away from the public firm. As a result, firm a’s optimal location becomes 1/2.
In short, a longer distance between firm b and the public firm yields the longer optimal distance
between firm a and the public firm. This strategic complementarity yields multiple equilibria.
Proposition 4 presents a property of equilibrium location but does not fully describe the equi-
librium location pattern when m ≥ 3. Since foreign firms never agglomerate at 1/2 in equilibrium,
the asymmetries between foreign firms inevitably arise. For example, the distance between each
foreign firm and the public firm never becomes the same across all foreign firms. Thus, as opposed
to the case without foreign firms, it is impossible to solve the m-foreign firm case systematically.
Although we can solve each of the problems in the case where m = 3,m = 4,m = 5, .., in the
interests of brevity we only present the results of a 3-foreign-firm case.10
Proposition 5 Suppose that m = 3. The following location choices constitute an equilibrium: each
domestic private firm i chooses either xi = 9216
√
2−10391
5750 ∼ 0.460 or xi = 16141−9216
√
2
5750 ∼ 0.540,
and the foreign firms choose xa = 3−
√
2
4 ∼ 0.396, xb = 1/2, and xc = 1+
√
2
4 ∼ 0.604, respectively.
10 The proof is available from the authors on request.
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4 Welfare implication
Given that n domestic private firms exist, we compare domestic welfare among four cases: (1) no
foreign firm exists (SW0); (2) one foreign firm exists (SW1); (3) two foreign firms exist, and they
locate at x = 1/2 (SW2a); and (4) two foreign firms exist, and each of them locates at x = 13/30
and x = 17/30 (SW2b).11
Comparing SW2b with SW2a, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (i) SW2b < SW2a if n = 0, and (ii) SW2b > SW2a for any n ≥ 1.
The differentiation between two foreign firms yields larger welfare than the agglomeration of them
if domestic firms exist. On the other hand, if no domestic private firm exists, agglomeration of
foreign firms is better for domestic welfare.
Suppose that there is no domestic private firm. The cost of the public firm, which is the sole
domestic supplier, is highest at the market 1/2. Thus, the increase of the supply for the market 1/2
improves welfare most efficiently. Suppose that a foreign domestic firm a locates at point y < 1/2
and the other foreign firm b locates at point 1− y. Suppose that both firms relocate, one at point
y′(y < y′ ≤ 1/2) and the other at point 1 − y′. We can show that the total output for market
x (y′ ≤ x ≤ 1− y′) increases, while that for the other market remains unchanged as long as both
firms provide a supply. Since the relocation increases the total output and, thus, consumer surplus
for market 1/2, it improves domestic welfare. Thus, the agglomeration of foreign firms improves
domestic welfare.
Suppose that domestic private firms exist. As mentioned above, the agglomeration of foreign
firms yields a higher total output of foreign firms, resulting in the profit transfer from domestic
firms to foreign firms. It reduces the profits of domestic private firms and total social domestic
surplus.
Next, we compare SW0, SW1, and SW2b. After comparing them, we have the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 7 (i) SW0 < SW1 < SW2b for n = 0, (ii) SW0 ≥ max{SW1, SW2b} for any n ≥ 1,
and (iii) SW1 > SW2b for any n ≥ 2.
Proposition 7 states that an increase in the number of foreign firms improves welfare if no domestic
firm exists. Conversely, if domestic private firms exist, eliminating foreign firms improves welfare.
11 The way to derive these values can be found in Matsushima and Matsumura (2005).
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Eliminating foreign firms increases the profits of domestic firms when domestic private firms exist;
thus, it improves domestic welfare. No such effect exists in the case without domestic private firms,
so eliminating foreign firms does not improve welfare.12
To check the efficiency of the locations, we consider the following solution. Suppose that the
social planner cannot control the output of each private firm but can control the locations of
domestic private firms. The following lemma shows that when the number of foreign firms is zero
or one, the location equilibrium is efficient from the viewpoint of social welfare.
Lemma 4 Suppose that the social planner cannot control the output of each private firm but can
control the locations of the domestic private firms. In that case, the social planner chooses the
locations x1 = x2 = . . . = xn = 1/2.
The result is similar to that of Matsushima and Matsumura (2003). In our model, the public firm
is inferior at the market near 1/2 and superior at the market near 0. Thus, additional production
by a private firm greatly improves social welfare at the market near 1/2 but not at the market
near 0. If each private firm locates at 1/2, the additional output is supplied most intensively at
the market where the additional supply has the most value.
As shown in Proposition 3, when there are two foreign firms, domestic private firms do not
agglomerate at 1/2. The location pattern in which two foreign firms exist is inefficient. We can
show that eliminating the public firm may enhance social welfare when there are two foreign firms.
Proposition 8 (i) Suppose that there are one public firms, one or zero foreign firm, and n do-
mestic private firms. Eliminating the public firm reduces social welfare. (ii) Suppose that there
are one public firm, two foreign firms, and n domestic private firms. Eliminating the public firm
enhances social welfare, if t satisfies the following inequalities:
900
(
1350− (n+ 3)
√
6((69623− 6255√66)n− 36970)
)
a
303750− (n+ 3)2((69623− 6255√66)n− 36970)) < t <
4a
n+ 2
. (9)
*************************************
Figure 1
************************************
When there is only one or zero foreign firms, the locations of domestic private firms are efficient
from the viewpoint of social welfare. On the contrary, when there are two foreign firms, the
12 For a discussion on private duopoly, see Ono (1990).
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locations of domestic private firms are inefficient from the viewpoint of social welfare. As the
transport cost per length increases, the welfare loss induced by the inefficient locations increases.
As the number of domestic private firms increases, the significance of the welfare loss increases.
Therefore, when the above inequalities are satisfied, the public firm harms social welfare.
5 Extensions
In this section, we investigate three problems that have been disregarded in the previous sections.13
5.1 Multiple public firms
In the previous sections, we assume that the number of public firms is one. In this section, we
investigate a model with two public firms. We consider the following three stage games: first, one
public firm (firm 0) chooses its location; second, the other public firm (firm 00) chooses its location
after observing firm 0’s location; third, observing the locations of the public firms, each private
firm chooses its location simultaneously; fourth, the firms set the quantities supplied at each point
x ∈ [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we assume that the public firms locate at xa and 1 − xa,
respectively (xa ∈ [0, 1/4]). In other words, firm 00 chooses the distance between two public firms,
2xa.
*************************************
Figure 2
************************************
5.1.1 No foreign firm
First, we consider the second stage location choices of domestic private firms, given the locations
of the public firms. For the same reason discussed in the previous sections, a private firm’s profit
is not affected by the locations of other domestic private firms, and each domestic private firm’s
location choice is strategically independent. Thus, it is sufficient to consider the location of a
domestic private firm.
Given the locations of the public firms, the optimal location of a private firm is x = 1/2. To
derive the result, we can use the results in Section 3 (one public firm case). The market structure
in the case two public firms can be decomposed as shown in the following figure.
13 The way to derive the results in this section can be found in Matsushima and Matsumura (2005).
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*************************************
Figure 3
************************************
A domestic firm determines which side is best and then where to locate within the selected side.
In this case, when xi = 1/2, the profit of the domestic firm is maximized.
Next, we consider the location choices of the public firms in the first and second stages. Taking
subsequent locations of private firms into account, social welfare (consumers’ surplus plus the sum
of the firms’ profits) is given by
SW = 2
(∫ xa
0
(a− t(xa −m))2
2b
dm+
∫ 1
2
xa
(a− t(m− xa))2
2b
dm
)
+ n× (1/2− xa)
3t2
3b
=
12a2 − 6(8x2a − 4xa + 1)at+ (12x2a − 6xa + 1 + n(1− 2xa)3)t2
24b
.
This is maximized:
x∗a =
−(4a− (n+ 1)t) +√(4a− t)(4a− (n+ 1)t)
2nt
. (10)
From Figure 4, we can see that x∗a ≤ 1/4, and strict inequality holds if n > 0.
*************************************
Figure 4
************************************
We have the following proposition:14
Proposition 9 Suppose that there are two public firms and that there is no foreign firm. In
equilibrium, the public firms locate at point x∗a and at point 1 − x∗a respectively, where x∗a is (10).
In the equilibrium, all domestic private firms locate at point x = 1/2.
If n = 0, the public firms choose the maximal distance between them because it minimizes
the total transport costs. We explain why the public firms choose the non-maximal distance
when n > 0. By increasing the distance between the public firms, they deprive market shares
from private firms locating at 1/2. Since the private firms’ transport costs are lower than those
of the public firms for the markets served by both the private and the public firms, the above
14 Taking subsequent locations of private firms into account, social welfare depends only on the distance between
two public firms. Thus, optimal location choice (x0, x00) = (x∗a, 1− x∗a) is achieved in equilibrium.
14
production substitution from the private to the public firms reduces welfare. Although the non-
maximal distance is inefficient from the viewpoint of the minimization concerning the public firms’
transport costs, the non-maximal distance is selected to avoid the welfare-reducing production
substitution. The production substitution effect becomes stronger when n is larger. This is the
reason that the distance between the public firms decreases in n.
5.1.2 One foreign firm
First, we discuss the location of the foreign firm. From (8), we conclude that the profit of the
foreign firm is the quarter of a domestic private firm’s profit function in the former subsection.
Therefore, the location of the foreign firm is identical to that of the domestic firm discussed in the
former subsection. That is, the foreign firm locates at x = 1/2.
Second, we discuss the locations of domestic private firms. We can easily identify x = 0 and
x = 1/2 as the candidates concerning the optimal location of each domestic private firm. We then
compare the two locations, x = 0 and x = 1/2. If xa is small, each domestic private firm locates at
x = 1/2; otherwise, it locates at x = 0.15 Locating at x = 1/2 has two effects on the profit of the
domestic private firm. When a domestic firm locates at x = 1/2, it faces lower prices caused by
the existence of the foreign firm and the larger market place. When the latter is more important,
that is, xa is small, each domestic firm locates at x = 1/2.
Third, we derive the optimal locations of the public firms. After complex calculations, we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 10 Suppose that there are two public firms and a foreign firm. In equilibrium, the
public firms locate at point 1/4 and at point 3/4, respectively. In equilibrium, all private firms
locate at point 0, and the foreign firm locates at point 1/2.
Propositions 9 and 10 indicate that the equilibrium locations of the public firms depend on the
number of foreign firms. If no foreign firm exists, the public firms choose the non-maximal distance
between them (Proposition 9). We explain why the public firms choose the maximal location when
a foreign firm exists. As noted above, increasing the distance between the public firms induces
production substitution from the private to the public firms. Since the substitution reduces the
foreign firm’s output, it increases the market share of the domestic firms (public and private) and
increases domestic social surplus. This is the reason that the public firms choose the maximal
15 The threshold value is x¯a ' 0.193, where x¯a satisfies 1− 6x¯a + 12x¯2a − 40x¯3a = 0.
15
distance.
5.1.3 Two foreign firms
We investigate the case where two foreign firms exist. The procedure to derive the optimal locations
of the firms is similar to the former subsections. After tedious calculus, we have the following
proposition:
Proposition 11 Suppose that there are two public firms and two foreign firms. Then the equilib-
rium locations of the public firms are x∗∗a and 1− x∗∗a , where x∗∗a is given by
x∗∗a =
√
(32a− 9t)(32a− (4n+ 9)t)− (32a− (4n+ 9)t)
8nt
. (11)
The equilibrium locations of the foreign firms are x = 0 and x = 1/2. The equilibrium location of
each domestic private firm is x = 1/2.
Proposition 11 indicates that the public firms again choose a non-maximal distance between
them. As is shown above, one foreign firm locates at 0 and the other foreign firm locates at
1/2. Increasing the distance between the public firms has three production substitution effects.
It induces production substitution from all domestic private firms and one foreign firm locating
at 1/2 to the public firms. At the same time, the increase in xa induces production substitution
from the public firms to the other foreign firm locating at 0. The last effect reduces domestic
welfare. On the other hand, when only one foreign firm exists, this effect does not exist. Thus, the
public firms have smaller incentives for increasing their distance, which yields the non-maximal
equilibrium distance.
5.1.4 Welfare implication
When two public firms exist, each one firm locates at a different point. From the equilibrium
locations of public firms, the two yield a larger welfare than one public firm does. The social
planner can locate the public firms at the same point, which yields the same equilibrium welfare
as that in the case of one public firm. Therefore, the additional public firm never reduces social
welfare.
As we discuss in Proposition 8, it is possible that no public firm is better than another from the
normative viewpoint. The question then naturally arises of whether no public firm or two public
firms yields a larger welfare. After tedious calculus, we can show that social welfare is larger in
the latter case. However, this result depends on the assumption that public firms are as efficient
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as private ones. If we consider the cost differences between public and private firms, which are
discussed in the next subsection, it is possible that this result does not hold.
5.2 Inefficient public firm
In previous sections, we assume that public firms are as efficient as private firms. In this subsection,
we consider a case in which a public firm is less efficient than private firms. We assume that the
marginal cost of the public firm is c > 0, while those of private firms are normalized to zero.16 We
restrict our attention to the case in which no foreign firms exist and one public firm exists. We
also assume that t < 2(a − (n + 1)c)/(n + 1), which ensures a positive quantity supplied by the
public firm at each point on the circular city.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that x0 = 0. From (8), the profit of a private firm i
locating at xi is given by the following function (note that, at each point, the marginal cost of the
public firm is td(x, x0) + c):
pii =
∫ xi
xi
2
(tm+ c− t(xi −m))2
b
dm
+
∫ 1
2
xi
(tm+ c− t(m− xi))2
b
dm+
∫ 1+xi
2
1
2
(t(1−m) + c− t(m− xi))2
b
dm
=
3c2 + 6ctxi + 3t(t− 2c)x2i − 4t2x3i
6b
.
Differentiating the function with respect to xi, we have:
∂pii
∂xi
=
t(1− 2xi)(c+ txi)
b
.
It is positive for any xi ∈ [0, 1/2), so the optimal location of each private firm is still 1/2. This
yields the following proposition.
Proposition 12 Suppose that there are one public firm, m domestic private firms and no foreign
firm. Suppose that t < 2(a− (n + 1)c)/(n + 1). The equilibrium location pattern does not depend
on c.
This proposition implies that the cost difference between public and private firms does not affect the
equilibrium location patterns. However, introducing a cost difference between public and private
firms yields quite an important welfare implication.
16 In this paper, we assume that these costs are given exogenously. For discussion of endogenous cost differences,
see Corneo and Rob (2003), Ishibashi and Matsumura (2005), Matsumura and Matsushima (2004), and Nett (1993).
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We compare the equilibrium welfare of a mixed oligopoly with that of a pure oligopoly, in which
a public firm is eliminated from the market. Figure 5 presents the area in which the removal of a
public firm improves welfare.
*************************************
Figure 5
************************************
From Figure 5, we can see that removing a public firm never improves welfare as long as the public
firm is as efficient as the private firm (i.e., c = 0). By removing the public firm, each private firm
produces more. In other words, production substitutions from the public firm to the private firm
take place. When c is large, these production substitutions save the production cost, resulting in
the improvement of welfare.
From this figure, we derive an interesting implication. Removing the public firm is more likely
to improve welfare when t is smaller. We explain the intuition behind this feature. When t = 0, for
any point, the public firm is less efficient than the private firms. Thus, the production substitution
discussed above significantly improves welfare. An increase in t decreases the relative inefficiency of
the public firm to the private firm for the markets close to the public firm’s location and increases
that for the markets close to the private firms’ location. Since the public firm’s outputs are larger
for the former markets than for the latter markets, an increase in t reduces the relative inefficiency
of the public firm, resulting in an increase in the value of the public firm. Thus, the removal of the
public firm is less likely to improve the welfare when t is large.
5.3 Entries by domestic private firms
In other sections, we assume that the number of firms is given exogenously. In this subsection,
we consider entries of domestic private firms. As opposed to the other sections, we assume that a
sufficiently large number of potential entrants exist and the number of entering firms is determined
by a zero-profit condition. We consider the case in which there is one public firm and no foreign
firm. Let F (>)0 be the entry cost of each private firm. Let pi(n) be each domestic private firm’s
gross profit. The zero profit condition, pi(n) = F , yields the equilibrium number of entering firms.17
We then discuss pi(n).
17 For discussions on free entry equilibrium in mixed oligopoly, see Anderson et al. (1997) and Matsumura and
Kanda (2005).
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As long as the public firm supplies its product for all of the points (or equivalently (n+1)t ≤ 2a),
pi(n) does not depend on n. This is because the equilibrium price at each market is equal to the
marginal cost of the public firm regardless of n and each firm’s output does not depend on n (see
the discussion in Section 3.1).
We then derive pi(n) when (n+1)t > 2a. We assume that the public firm locates at x = 0 and
the domestic private firms locate at x = 1/2. If this location pattern is an equilibrium outcome,
we have
pi(n) =
∫ 2a+tn
2(2n+1)t
1
4
(tm− t(1/2−m))2)
b
dm+
∫ 1
2
2a+tn
2(2n+1)t
(a− t(1/2−m))2)
(n+ 1)2b
dm
=
−32(4n+ 3)a3 + 96(n+ 1)2a2t− 24(n+ 1)2at2 + 2(n+ 1)2t3
48b(n+ 1)2(2n+ 1)2t
. (12)
We can show that if t ≤ 4(4n3 − n + 1)a/(2n2 + n − 1)2, this location pattern in fact becomes
an equilibrium one (see Matsushima and Matsumura (2005)). From Figure 6, we can see that the
condition (n+ 1)t ≤ 2a is stricter than the condition t ≤ 4(4n3 − n+ 1)a/(2n2 + n− 1)2, so there
exists n such that both (n+ 1)t > 2a and t ≤ 4(4n3 − n+ 1)a/(2n2 + n− 1)2 are satisfied.
*************************************
Figure 6
************************************
We then discuss examples of pi(n). We consider two cases (t = a/4 and t = a/2). Figure 7 depicts
pi(n) in the two cases.
*************************************
Figure 7
************************************
Consider the first case (t = a/4). If F > 2.604a2/1000b, no domestic private firm enters the market.
If F = 2.604a2/1000b, the number of firms is indeterminate (from 0 to 7). If 1.156a2/1000b < F <
2.604a2/1000b, the number of private firms is between 7 and 15 (and all of them agglomerate
at one point). If F < 1.156a2/1000b, the number of firms exceeds 15, and private firms do not
agglomerate at one point (we failed to derive the location pattern explicitly in the low fixed-cost
case).
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6 Concluding remarks
This study investigates a location–quantity model of mixed markets. The equilibrium location
pattern depends on the number of foreign private firms and not on the number of domestic private
firms. Spatial agglomeration of all private firms appears in a unique equilibrium if the number of
foreign firms is zero or one. If the number of foreign firms is two, domestic and foreign private firms
agglomerate at different points. The presence of more than two foreign firms yields differentiation
among foreign firms (i.e., there is no equilibrium in which all foreign firms agglomerate at one
point). Regardless of the number of firms, agglomeration of all domestic private firms appears in
equilibrium. This study also investigates three issues concerning multiple public firms, inefficient
public firm, and entries by private firms. In the first issue, we show that the locations of the
multiple public firms crucially depend on the number of foreign firms. In the second issue, we show
that the removal of the inefficient public firm may improve welfare. In the third issue, we show
several examples concerning the relation between the number of entrants (private firms) and the
entry costs.
In this paper, we assume that the public firm is a welfare maximizer. Although this assumption
is very popular among the models of mixed oligopoly,18 other approaches also exist.19 Deviation
from this welfare-maximizing assumption and the application of other approaches to this problem
remain topics for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. From (3), we obtain that b(q0 +
∑
i∈D qi) = a − td(x, x0). This yields
Lemma 1(i). From (3), we obtain that
td(x, x0) = a− b
(
q0 +
∑
i∈D
qi
)
≥ p(x) ≡ a− b
(
q0 +
∑
i∈D∪F
qi
)
. (13)
Thus, if d(x, x0) ≤ d(x, xi), p(x) ≤ td(x, x0) ≤ td(x, xi). That is, firm i’s cost is never lower than
the price, so it does not supply for the market, x. This yields Lemma 1(ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. Proposition 1 obviously holds true if n = 1. Suppose that n ≥ 2. We
assume that there is no equilibrium where x1 = x2 and derive a contradiction. Suppose that firm
2 deviates from the equilibrium strategy and chooses the same location as firm 1. From Lemma 1,
we have that the locations of all other firms are still optimal. Because of the symmetries between
all domestic private firms this location is best for firm 2 since it is best for firm 1. Thus, this
location pattern constitutes an equilibrium, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We have already shown that the location of private firms does not
affects the profits of each private firm. Thus, if Proposition 2 holds true when n = 1, it also holds
true for any n ≥ 1. Thus, we prove Proposition 2 in the case of n = m = 1. Suppose that firm 1
(firm 2) is a domestic (foreign) private firm.
First, we show that the optimal location of firm 2 is 1/2 given that x0 = 0 and x1 = 1/2.
By symmetry, without loss of generality, we assume that x2 ∈ [0, 1/2]. Since no other foreign firm
exists, q2(x) in (7) is positive if and only if td(x, x0) > td(x, x2). Therefore, firm 2 supplies at
x ∈ (x2/2, (1 + x2)/2). For x ∈ (x2/2, (1 + x2)/2), the quantity supplied by firm 2 is
q2(x) =
td(x, x0)− td(x, x2)
2b
. (14)
From (8), firm 2’s profit is:
pi2 =
∫ x2
x2
2
(tx+ t(x2 − x)− 2t(x2 − x))2
4b
dx+
∫ 1
2
x2
(tx+ t(x− x2)− 2t(x− x2))2
4b
dx
+
∫ 1+x2
2
1
2
(t(1− x) + t(x− x2)− 2t(x− x2))2
4b
dx =
t2x22(3− 4x2)
24b
. (15)
Differentiating pi2 with respect to x2, we have ∂pi2/∂x2 = (t2x2(1−2x2))/4b ≥ 0. This implies that
the best reply of firm 2 is x2 = 1/2.
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Next, we show that firm 1’s best location is x1 = 1/2 given the others’ locations. By symmetry,
without loss of generality, we assume that x1 ∈ [0, 1/2]. We consider the following two segments:
(1) x1 ∈ [0, 1/4] and (2) x1 ∈ (1/4, 1/2].
(1) x1 ∈ [0, 1/4]: From Lemma 1(ii), firm 1 does not supply at x ∈ [0, x1/2], so its profit from
market x ∈ [0, x1/2] is zero. From Lemma 1(ii), firm 2 does not supply at x ∈ [0, 1/4]. From (8),
firm 1’s profit at x ∈ (x1/2, 1/4] is
pi1(x) =
(tx− td(x1, x))2
b
. (16)
Consider the market x > 1/4. From Lemma 1(ii), firm 1 does not supply for the market x ≥
3/4(≥ (x1 + 1)/2). In the former part of this proof, we have already shown that firm 2 supplies
at x ∈ (1/4, 3/4) (since x2 = 1/2). From (7) and (14), firm 1 supplies only for the market
x < (1 + 4x1)/4. For the market x ∈ (1/4, (1 + 4x1)/4), the profit of firm 1 is given by
pi1(x) =
(tx+ td(x2, x)− 2td(x1, x))2
4b
. (17)
Thus, the total profit of the domestic firm is:
pi1 =
∫ x1
x1
2
(tx− t(x1 − x))2
b
dx+
∫ 1
4
x1
(tx− t(x− x1))2
b
dx
+
∫ 1+4x1
4
1
4
(tx+ t( 12 − x)− 2t(x− x1))2
4b
dx =
t2x21(1− 2x1)
4b
. (18)
Differentiating pi1 with respect to x1, we have:
∂pi1
∂x1
=
t2x1(1− 3x1)
2b
> 0. (19)
(2) x1 ∈ (1/4, 1/2]: From Lemma 1(ii), firm 1 does not supply at x ∈ [0, x1/2], so its profit
from market x ∈ [0, x1/2] is zero. From Lemma 1(ii), firm 2 does not supply at x ∈ [0, 1/4]. From
(8), firm 1’s profit at x ∈ (x1/2, 1/4] is given by (16).
Consider the market x > 1/4. From Lemma 1(ii) firm 1 does not supply for the market x ≥
3/4(≥ (x1 + 1)/2). In the former part of this proof, we have already shown that firm 2 supplies
at x ∈ (1/4, 3/4) (since x2 = 1/2). From (7) and (14), firm 1 supplies only for the market
x < (1+4x1)/4. For the market x ∈ (1/4, (1+4x1)/4), the profit of firm 1 is given by (17). Noting
that (1 + 4x1)/4 ≥ 1/2, we have that the resulting profit of firm 1 is:
pi1=
∫ 1
4
x1
2
(tx− t(x1 − x))2
b
dx+
∫ x1
1
4
(tx+ t(1/2− x)− 2t(x1 − x))2
4b
dx
22
+
∫ 1
2
x1
(tx+ t(1/2− x)− 2t(x− x1))2
4b
dx+
∫ 1+4x1
4
1
2
(t(1− x) + t(x− 1/2)− 2t(x− x1))2
4b
dx
=
t2(16x31 − 24x21 + 12x1 − 1)
96b
. (20)
Differentiating pi1 with respect to x1, we have:
∂pi1
∂x1
=
t2(1− 2x1)2
8b
≥ 0. (21)
(19) and (21) imply that the optimal location of firm 1 is x1 = 1/2. Q.E.D.
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